'Bodily precision': A predictive coding account of individual differences in interoceptive accuracy by Ainley, V et al.
1 
 
‘Bodily Precision’: A Predictive Coding Account of Individual Differences in 1 
Interoceptive Accuracy 2 
 3 
Vivien Ainley1* 4 
Matthew A J Apps2 5 
Aikaterini Fotopoulou3 6 
Manos Tsakiris1 7 
 8 
1 Lab of Action and Body, Department of Psychology Royal Holloway University of London 9 
2 Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford 10 
3 Research Dept. of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology, University College London  11 
 12 
*Corresponding Authors: Dr Vivien Ainley, v.l.ainley@rhul.ac.uk 13 
 14 
Keywords: interoception, interoceptive accuracy, heartbeat perception, free energy, 15 
predictive coding  16 
 17 
Acknowledgments: MAJA is supported by an Anniversary Future Leader fellowship from 18 
the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BB/M013596/1). AF is 19 
supported by a European Research Council Starting Investigator Award (ERC-2012-STG 20 
GA313755). MT is supported by a European Research Council Starting Investigator Grant 21 
(ERC-2010-StG-262853). We thank two anonymous reviewers for their generous 22 
contributions to the manuscript. 23 
  24 
2 
 
Abstract 25 
Individuals differ in their awareness of afferent information from within their bodies, which 26 
is typically assessed by a heartbeat perception measure of ‘interoceptive accuracy’. Neural 27 
and behavioural correlates of this trait have been investigated but a theoretical explanation 28 
has yet to be presented. Building on recent models that describe interoception within the free 29 
energy/predictive coding framework, this paper applies similar principles to interoceptive 30 
accuracy, proposing that individual differences in interoceptive accuracy depend on 31 
‘precision’ in interoceptive systems, i.e. the relative weight accorded to ‘prior’ 32 
representations and ‘prediction errors’ (that part of incoming interoceptive sensation not 33 
accounted for by priors), at various levels within the cortical hierarchy and between 34 
modalities. Attention has the effect of optimising precision both within and between sensory 35 
modalities. Our central assumption is that people with high interoceptive accuracy are able, 36 
with attention, to prioritise interoception over other sensory modalities and can thus adjust the 37 
relative precision of their interoceptive priors and prediction errors, where appropriate, given 38 
their personal history. This characterisation explains key findings within the interoception 39 
literature; links results previously seen as unrelated or contradictory; and may have important 40 
implications for understanding cognitive, behavioural and psychopathological consequences 41 
of both high and low interoceptive awareness. 42 
 43 
Introduction 44 
The free energy principle proposes that living systems are driven to minimise the sum of 45 
differences between the sensory sensations they encounter and the sensory inputs predicted 46 
by internal models of the world (1). Perception, action, attention and learning have all been 47 
described within this account (1). It is timely that interoception – defined as afferent 48 
information arising from within the body (2) - has recently been placed at the heart of free 49 
energy minimisation, with the recognition that interoceptive signals provide the organism 50 
with the vital maps of its internal states that underpin homeostasis (3–7). However, recent 51 
theoretical models (6,8) have typically not discussed one of the most prominent topics within 52 
the interoception literature - namely the considerable variability that individuals display in 53 
their ability to call interoceptive signals into awareness and the influence that this variability 54 
has on behaviour. The purpose of this paper is to apply the free energy framework to explain 55 
‘interoceptive accuracy’ (IAcc) which is assumed to reflect trait awareness of interoceptive 56 
sensations. 57 
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The free energy framework is operationalised under the principles of predictive coding and 58 
Bayesian inference (9). It is assumed that the brain builds internal ‘generative models’, within 59 
which ‘prior’ predictions/beliefs about what accounts for the incoming sensory data are 60 
updated by ‘prediction errors’ (PEs), which are that part of the data that is not compatible 61 
with the prior. These probabilistic predictions are passed, top-down, through hierarchical 62 
brain pathways, while PEs are passed, bottom-up, for resolution at a higher level, such that 63 
the ‘posterior’ prediction at any one level (after updating to accommodate PEs) becomes the 64 
prior for the level below (Figure 1) (1). Technically, these priors are known as empirical 65 
priors. Empirical priors are posterior beliefs that arise within the hierarchies of the (sensory) 66 
data and are therefore prior beliefs that are informed by sensory evidence. For simplicity, we 67 
refer to these as priors. The interoceptive hierarchy in the brain has been described, extending 68 
from spinal visceral afferents to subcortical structures and projecting to the amygdala, insula, 69 
anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal cortices (7,10). Although interoceptive predictions and 70 
prediction errors must be reconciled at each level of this hierarchy, the insula is assumed to 71 
be the principal cortical region in the interoceptive pathway, being activated by all 72 
interoceptive and affective stimuli (11), but see also (7). Diffusion tensor and functional 73 
imaging data indicate that the anterior insula is a hub between brain networks involved in 74 
externally-directed attention to stimuli in the environment and internally-directed attention to 75 
one’s body (12). Thus it is potentially the key region that mediates variability in the influence 76 
of interoceptive signals on behaviour (13), which is the trait that IAcc seeks to capture. 77 
 78 
[Insert Figure 1] 79 
 80 
Much of interoceptive signalling supports homeostasis without awareness but people are also 81 
capable of being aware of interoceptive sensations - either through top-down directed 82 
attention, as in a heartbeat counting task, or as a result of bottom-up salience, such as when 83 
perceiving the racing heart that accompanies arousal. Psychological research into 84 
interoceptive awareness has focused mainly on objective measures of the accuracy with 85 
which we become aware of our heartbeats because of the known role that heart-brain 86 
interactions (and concomitant balance between the sympathetic and parasympathetic systems) 87 
plays in emotion processing (10). ‘Interoceptive accuracy’ (IAcc) is generally measured by 88 
one of two types of heartbeat perception tasks. IAcc is assumed to reflect the individual’s trait 89 
awareness of, and tendency to be influenced by, their interoceptive sensations. Of the two 90 
principal heartbeat perception tasks, ‘mental tracking’ involves counting one’s heartbeat (14), 91 
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whereas ‘heartbeat discrimination’ requires judging whether an external signal is 92 
synchronous with one’s heartbeat (15). Although it has been suggested that heartbeat 93 
counting tasks are confounded by the use of particular strategies and do not reflect awareness 94 
of the heartbeat per se (16), there is an extensive research literature linking both types of 95 
heartbeat awareness measures to a variety of behavioural outcomes (17,18). This suggests 96 
that IAcc does reflect trait awareness of interoceptive sensation and consequent behaviour. 97 
Moreover, scores on the two types of heartbeat perception test correlate in individuals with 98 
above average IAcc (19) and both measures are related to awareness of gastric cues (20,21). 99 
Except where otherwise stated, this paper cites studies that have measured IAcc using 100 
heartbeat counting. The purpose of our model is to contribute to the understanding of 101 
mechanisms that potentially underlie variability in IAcc, which may in turn clarify its 102 
behavioural effects. Here, we present a model of IAcc according to the free energy 103 
framework, in order to provide a better understanding of the mechanisms that underlie 104 
variability in IAcc, and in turn clarify its behavioural effects. We first outline how the free 105 
energy and predictive coding principles provide an account of interoceptive signalling, 106 
followed by a discussion of how this can be applied to IAcc. We subsequently link this 107 
account with other variables and with behaviour. Finally, we indicate how this model may 108 
provide a novel perspective on mental health problems in which IAcc is putatively an 109 
underlying cause.  110 
 111 
‘Perceptual inference’, precision and ‘active inference’ within predictive coding 112 
IAcc depends on forming percepts for heartbeats, although awareness may be at the very 113 
borders of conscious perception (5). Within predictive coding it is assumed that perception is 114 
achieved by ‘perceptual inference’, which requires minimisation of free energy (equivalent to 115 
the sum total of PEs) at every level in the hierarchy, so that the sensory data has been 116 
accounted for as fully as possible and a precept is formed (1). This process applies equally 117 
well to interoceptive percepts (by ‘interoceptive inference’) (5) and to percepts that do not 118 
reach conscious awareness (22).  119 
 120 
Within predictive coding, empirical priors, predictions and associated PEs are all represented 121 
in terms of expectations and precisions. (Expectations and precisions correspond to first and 122 
second order moments of the probabilistic beliefs). ‘Precision’ refers to the inverse variance 123 
associated with each probability distribution and is thus a measure of their relative salience 124 
and reliability (1). Precision operates both within and between modalities. Within any 125 
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modality, at each level of the hierarchy and taking account of the given context, the brain 126 
weighs the relative precision of PEs that inform or revise expectations at higher level of the 127 
hierarchy (22,23). Figure 2 illustrates this relationship schematically. If PEs are precise 128 
relative to a prior (as in the top panel of Figure 2), this implies that they carry more reliable 129 
information than the prior and the likely effect is that they will update the prior i.e. that the 130 
posterior will shift in the direction of the PEs, with increased precision. For example, 131 
jumping into a swimming pool on a hot day produces precise PEs that will update the priors 132 
for body temperature. The (updated) posterior at any given level becomes a prior for the level 133 
below in the hierarchy.  134 
 135 
A relatively precise prior, by contrast may be impervious to imprecise PEs from the level 136 
below. Examples are various visual illusions which depend on precise (overlearned) priors 137 
that do not update to incoming sensory data (24). This is represented by the lower panel of 138 
Figure 2. Given that precision is always relative and that precepts are usually multimodal, 139 
precision plays a similarly crucial role in weighting the available information that arises from 140 
various modalities and converges on multimodal association areas in the sensory hierarchy. 141 
For example, at night when the precision of vision declines, the relative precision of PEs in 142 
others modality rises, which accounts for our tendency to rely on touch and audition in the 143 
dark. The relative precision of interoceptive signals may also increase, which one author has 144 
suggested might explain humanity’s common fear of ‘bogeymen’ (25). Importantly for our 145 
model, the relative precision of PEs and priors within and between modalities is constantly 146 
being updated (26).  147 
 148 
[Insert Figure 2] 149 
 150 
Precise PEs can also lead to ‘active inference’ whereby the organism moves, in order to 151 
acquire more sensory information with which to confirm or update its priors. It does this by 152 
forming a prediction of the proprioceptive consequences of the intended/desired movement. 153 
This prediction gives rise to precise proprioceptive PEs which descend through the hierarchy 154 
providing motor control, fulfilled at the lowest level by peripheral motor reflexes (1). 155 
Mechanisms equivalent to active inference exist in interoception (5,7). If there are deviations 156 
from the desired (prior) inner state of the body (e.g. there is a fall in body temperature 157 
because one jumps into a swimming pool), the consequent interoceptive PEs may be resolved 158 
by updating interoceptive priors (the water soon feels less cold). However, interoceptive PEs 159 
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can also resolve themselves by engaging peripheral autonomic reflexes (e.g. closing 160 
capillaries) in the same way that precise prediction errors enslave classical motor reflex arcs 161 
to elicit movement (4,6). In other words, interoceptive and proprioceptive prediction errors 162 
can either ascend into the brain to revise prior beliefs or descend to the periphery to make 163 
those prior beliefs come true by engaging reflexes. The relative precision of ascending and 164 
descending prediction errors therefore determines whether reflexes are engaged. If 165 
interoceptive prediction errors are sufficiently precise they may be resolved through motor 166 
action (4) (such as moving to a warmer place) or directly (e.g. by shivering). Thus perception, 167 
action and autonomic response are united within one powerful overarching framework (3). 168 
A model of heartbeat perception with a predictive coding framework 169 
Healthy people do not generally perceive their heartbeats in day-to-day experience, despite 170 
the strength and pervasiveness of the signal (2). This potentially surprising phenomenon can 171 
readily be explained within predictive coding. When a stimulus is fully predicted, the prior 172 
will match the incoming sensory data, there will be no PEs, no updating of priors and 173 
consequently no percept. The strength, rhythm, and variability of one’s heartbeat are 174 
constantly present. This implies that the heartbeat is fully predicted by the brain in contexts 175 
that have been regularly experienced. Contexts that elicit unexpected changes in heart 176 
functioning, on the other hand, may require a response from the organism and are likely to 177 
reach awareness. It follows that during a heartbeat perception test, whenever an individual is 178 
temporarily able to perceive a heartbeat, sensory information about the heartbeat is not, in 179 
that particular moment, being fully predicted by one’s priors. The reason for this must lie in 180 
the nature of the task, which requires focused top-down attention to the heartbeat, while other 181 
variables that might affect the heartbeat itself (such as arousal) are held constant.  182 
 183 
Crucially for our model the effect of attention within predictive coding is to optimise the 184 
precision of sensory signals, by assigning the best possible relative precision (for that 185 
particular individual) between modalities and also between priors and PEs within modalities 186 
(27). It is important to note that the role of attention in the free energy framework is not to 187 
promote salience but to optimise precision i.e. to regulate whether, at a given moment, in any 188 
given context or modality, PEs or priors have more weigh in determining the percept. 189 
Attention optimises precision by continually fine-tuning the precisions of all priors and all 190 
PEs, both in the very short term as well as over longer time frames. The priors themselves 191 
will tend to become more precise through the updating involved in learning but this is always 192 
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subject to change if precise contradictory information (PEs) emerge. Thus attention does not 193 
so much promote salience as optimise salience. This optimisation of precision therefore 194 
serves the overall goal of reducing PEs and free energy over time (8).   195 
 196 
It follows that the ability of individuals to be aware of their heartbeats must depend on their 197 
ability to enhance the precision of their interoceptive signals by attending to them. The ability 198 
to increase precision in interoceptive systems will be dictated at a higher level in the brain 199 
hierarchy (Figure 1), where a further prior (not necessarily conscious), about the importance 200 
of interoceptive sensation relative to other modalities, will govern the overall precision of 201 
interoceptive information. Thus if the individual uses attention to increase the relative 202 
precision of interoception as a modality, this will have the effect of raising the precision of 203 
PEs vs. priors within interoceptive systems.  204 
 205 
A much-discussed issue within the interoception literature is the extent to which objective 206 
measures of IAcc measure the tendency to be influenced by interoceptive signals (19). Our 207 
model assumes that if an individual is able to perceive heartbeats by directed top-down 208 
attention (IAcc) during a heart-beat perception task, then the same optimisation principles are 209 
more likely to apply in daily life, as regards both top-down and bottom-up attention to 210 
interoceptive sensations. We assume that the interoceptive experience of people with high 211 
IAcc is therefore characterised by the continuous, Bayes optimal, updating of interoceptive 212 
priors, at the borders of conscious awareness, which can account for the behaviour associated 213 
with trait interoceptive awareness, as discussed below. 214 
 215 
We propose that people with lower IAcc, by contrast, are those who are unable to enhance the 216 
precision of their interoceptive signals by focused attention during heartbeat perception tasks. 217 
This implies that interoception is, for them, a sensory modality with less habitual salience, 218 
leading to less frequent updating of priors and hence less flexible adjusting of precision 219 
throughout the interoceptive hierarchy. As we review below, this may make them more liable 220 
to illusory percepts and/or aberrant beliefs (priors) (28). It is consistent with our account that 221 
although people with low IAcc cannot easily increase the precision of heartbeat with 222 
endogenous attention, when their attention to interoception is driven by external stress, for 223 
example during physical exercise or emotional arousal, the effect is generally to raise IAcc, 224 
regardless of the person’s baseline IAcc (2,17).  225 
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 226 
Our model assumes that during a heartbeat perception task the increased precision of PEs 227 
(relative to priors for the heartbeat) causes these PEs to be projected up through the cortical 228 
hierarchy where, at some level, the heartbeat can be detected, potentially in the anterior insula 229 
(11). Our model is therefore consistent with the greater cortical activity in the anterior insula 230 
that has been observed during both types of heartbeat perception tasks in better (compared 231 
with less good) heartbeat perceivers (14,15), as people with higher IAcc experience greater 232 
updating of their interoceptive priors - thus over time being able to adjust more easily to any 233 
changes to habitual heart parameters. By contrast, we assume that people with lower IAcc are 234 
not able to adjust the precision of their interoceptive signals with attention and are thus not as 235 
good in perceiving their own heartbeats, at will, during IAcc tests.  236 
 237 
Such mechanisms would explain why, during tests of interoception, ‘the threshold level of 238 
consciousness reportability constantly fluctuates’ (2, page 81). Analogously to the process of 239 
binocular rivalry (29), we suggest that, as the prediction updates, the heartbeat is temporarily 240 
available to awareness until it is once again fully predicted and becomes unavailable to 241 
perception, before attention starts the cycle of updating again.  242 
 243 
Influences on precision 244 
Why the precision accorded to interoceptive signals might differ between individuals has not 245 
yet been fully elucidated. Precision depends on the post-synaptic gain of superficial 246 
pyramidal cells (the cells that signal PEs) (30). Acetylcholine and dopamine are thought to 247 
determine precision in perception and action respectively (1) and oxytocin may perform this 248 
function in interoception (30). IAcc, which our model assumes depends on the precision of 249 
interoceptive signals, correlates with concentrations of both GABA (31) and glutamate in the 250 
insula (32). Crucially however, precision is refined by learning (27,33). In order to minimise 251 
free energy (and thus PEs), the brain must continually optimise the relative precisions of PEs 252 
and priors, over time and across all sensory modalities and contexts, for the particular 253 
individual (1,8). Our model implies that in people with higher IAcc this optimisation involves 254 
the prioritising of interoceptive sensations such that they can be called into awareness, with 255 
attention. Potentially high IAcc may, at least in part, result from learned attention to internal 256 
bodily changes (interoceptive PEs), relative to other sensory modalities, presumably due to 257 
various neurophysiological and psychosocial parameters in development and during the 258 
lifespan.  259 
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 260 
Application of the model to prominent aspects of the literature on IAcc 261 
 262 
(i) Heartbeat-evoked potentials 263 
Heartbeat perception tasks tap a continuum between day-to-day pre-consciousness and 264 
conscious awareness of the heartbeat under focused attention. This suggests that IAcc will be 265 
related to the amplitude of heartbeat-evoked potentials (HEPs), which are characteristic 266 
waves of cortical activity that accompany the rhythmic activity of the heart, whether or not 267 
the heartbeat is consciously perceived. HEPs can be observed with EEG as a positive 268 
potential shift over right fronto-central electrodes, 200-600ms after the R-wave of the 269 
heartbeat (34). They have been source localised to the insula and anterior cingulate cortex 270 
(35) and are considered to be an index of cortical interoceptive processing, for example being 271 
modulated by affective tasks (36,37). As our model would expect, high IAcc is associated 272 
with greater amplitude of HEPs (34). Moreover, when that amplitude is enhanced by 273 
attention, this effect is stronger in people with higher IAcc (38). It is generally thought that 274 
PEs are encoded by superficial pyramidal cells that are the major contributor to 275 
neurophysiological responses recorded empirically. This is potentially important because the 276 
amplitude of evoked responses will therefore reflect their precision and the degree to which 277 
PEs are afforded more weight or confidence. 278 
 279 
 (ii) Attention to interoception 280 
Several studies have used heartbeat counting to experimentally enhance attention to 281 
interoception. For example, a preliminary period of attention to heartbeats enhances BOLD 282 
activity in the anterior insula during later judgments about emotional faces (39). Our model 283 
assumes that attention increases the precision of PEs associated with the heartbeat, which are 284 
then cascaded up through the hierarchy causing activity visible in the anterior insula under 285 
fMRI (40). These results potentially imply that enhanced precision persists for a short period 286 
- i.e. that the precision of the prior is down-weighted in this instance for an extended period 287 
of time. Interestingly, while people with high IAcc show an increase in BOLD activity in the 288 
anterior insula during heartbeat counting, functional connectivity analysis has revealed that, 289 
in good heartbeat perceivers only, attention to heartbeats also decreases connectivity between 290 
lower and higher levels of the interoceptive hierarchy from the right posterior to the right 291 
anterior insula, (41). The authors of this study suggest that ‘an increase in salience may be 292 
achieved by decreasing the amount of noise that is transported along this axis’ (41, page 12). 293 
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Our model would suggest that as attention increases the salience of the heartbeat, in people 294 
with high IAcc, it diminishes the relative precision of other interoceptive signals within the 295 
insula, thus ‘decreasing the amount of noise’. As attention increases the salience of the 296 
heartbeat in people with high IAcc, it increases the precision of ascending interoceptive PEs. 297 
This would correspond to an increased sensitivity to ascending PEs and high gain on 298 
autonomic reflexes. It is important to notice that there is no neuronal ‘noise’ in predictive 299 
coding; the noise is actually estimated as part of the inference and encoded in terms of 300 
expected precision, by synaptic gain. 301 
 302 
People with high IAcc (measured by heartbeat discrimination) perform above chance on tests 303 
of masked fear conditioning (42). Our interpretation is that these individuals experience 304 
precise PEs associated with the fear-provoking stimuli, so that the interoceptive changes that 305 
occur when they orient to the fear cues are likely to update their priors for the heartbeat and 306 
facilitate the detection of the fear-provoking trials. Assuming that attention to heartbeat 307 
enhances the precision of PEs arising from the heart (28), we would expect masked fear 308 
conditioning to be stronger after practice on a heartbeat discrimination task, which has also 309 
been reported (43). 310 
  311 
(iii) Autonomic reactivity 312 
As explained above, our model implies that precise interoceptive PEs can either ascend into 313 
the brain to revise prior beliefs (and thus give rise to emotion, as discussed below) or they 314 
may descend to the periphery to make those prior beliefs come true by engaging autonomic 315 
reflexes. A major implication of our model is therefore that individuals with high IAcc, who 316 
experience more updating of interoceptive priors by PEs, will also experience greater 317 
autonomic reactivity to emotional stimuli, whenever the effect on the heartbeat of those 318 
stimuli is not fully predicted so that they give rise to interoceptive PEs. These PEs will pass 319 
down through the cortical levels with the potential to be ultimately resolved by interoceptive 320 
active inference in the form of autonomic reflexes (3–5). In support of this interpretation, a 321 
number of studies have demonstrated greater autonomic reactivity in individuals with higher 322 
IAcc. They show: (i) greater amplitude of respiratory sinus arrhythmia in response to a hand 323 
encroaching into peripersonal space (44); (ii) greater heart rate deceleration when viewing 324 
emotional stimuli (45); and (iii) greater amplitudes of the P300 and slow wave under EEG in 325 
response to emotionally arousing pictures (46)  (where the P300 is thought to indicate the 326 
updating of representations of the current environment). All of these results can be explained 327 
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if precise interoceptive PEs boost interoceptive processing in people with higher IAcc. 328 
Conversely (iv) individuals with higher IAcc are able to use appraisal to reduce the amplitude 329 
of their P300 response to affective stimuli (47), which we would interpret in terms of their 330 
precise PEs enabling them to more readily update interoceptive priors associated with these 331 
emotional stimuli.  332 
 333 
 (iv) Emotion  334 
The seminal model that first placed interoception within the free energy and predictive 335 
coding framework, proposes that emotion results from the brain’s interpretation of 336 
interoceptive precepts (by ‘interoceptive inference’) (5). A related definition accounts for 337 
emotional valence by suggesting that emotion is the result of changes in free energy, with 338 
falling free energy producing negative emotion and vice versa (48). Our model complements 339 
these formulations and extends the latter by suggesting that emotional arousal is dependent 340 
on interoceptive precision. A fundamental assumption of our model is that the interoceptive 341 
PEs of people with higher IAcc may be cascaded up the interoceptive hierarchy, rather than 342 
being suppressed by low-level priors. Given that these interoceptive PEs indicate changes in 343 
free energy, we conclude that they will consequently give rise to feelings of generalised 344 
physiological arousal and ultimately to specific learned emotions (48). As a result, we expect 345 
people with higher IAcc to report stronger emotional arousal for identical objective changes 346 
in physiological arousal. This has been reported in a range of studies, using both types of 347 
heartbeat perception task (15,45,46). Assuming that the interoceptive changes associated with 348 
any memory is greater for people with high IAcc, similar mechanisms would account for 349 
their enhanced capacity to remember stimuli that alter interoceptive signals, such as heart rate 350 
(49).  351 
 352 
Our account can also explain why people with higher IAcc are more averse to making errors, 353 
given the assumption that the affective significance of making a mistake is recorded as 354 
interoceptive PE. For example, IAcc correlates with post-error slowing on the Simon task and 355 
with the amplitude of the error-positivity component shown by EEG (50). This aversion may, 356 
in turn, explain why people with high IAcc have greater difficulty inhibiting the tendency to 357 
imitate observed, task-irrelevant, actions (51), presumably the affective significance of the 358 
near-errors involved are stronger for them and thus tend to slow their reaction times. 359 
Furthermore, a failure to attenuate sensory precision (the context of sensory attenuation) may 360 
also result in autonomic forms of echopraxia and emotional contagion (52). 361 
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 362 
(v) Enhanced self-focus 363 
Attending to self-relevant information temporarily enhances IAcc but only in those people for 364 
whom IAcc is originally low (53). Our model proposes that such people have difficulty 365 
enhancing precision in interoceptive systems by attending to interoceptive cues per se. 366 
However, we assume that the self is a multilevel, multimodal construct, continually updated 367 
in the brain from all available interacting cues including interoception (6,33). Precision 368 
necessarily varies along this hierarchy (24,54). If self-focus enhances the precision of a high-369 
level (conscious) prior for the multimodal self, this will affect the precision of priors and PEs 370 
at lower levels of the self-hierarchy (including those for the heartbeat itself). In people with 371 
high IAcc this would be unlikely to have any additional effect on heartbeat perception. 372 
However, for people with low IAcc the effect could be to enhance the precision of all self-373 
relevant and self-specifying signals, including interoceptive PEs, thus enabling updating of 374 
priors in interoceptive systems and consequent perception of heartbeats. 375 
 376 
(vi) Body ownership 377 
Individuals with high IAcc are less susceptible to illusory body ownership (18). In the rubber 378 
hand illusion the participant’s hidden hand is stroked synchronously with a fake hand, onto 379 
which visual attention is focused. To experience the illusion, participants must form the 380 
percept that the prosthetic hand is their own, by minimising PEs across all available sensory 381 
modalities according to their relative precision (33). The final (illusory) precept depends on 382 
the normally high precision of visual and somatosensory PEs (enhanced by attention). 383 
However, neither vision nor touch is self-specific. Interoceptive cues, by contrast, provide 384 
uniquely self-specifying sensory input. Their importance is indicated by the way the immune 385 
system starts to disown the real hand as the illusion takes hold (55). We suggest that people 386 
with high IAcc resist the illusion because they are able to attend to, and thus enhance the 387 
precision of, their interoceptive cues during multisensory integration. The fake hand does not 388 
have the interoceptive feelings (priors) attached to the true hand. In people with high IAcc 389 
this will set up interoceptive PEs which will serve to update these priors and give rise to 390 
interoceptive percepts for the true hand, thus anchoring the sense of body ownership. 391 
 392 
A contrasting paradigm dispenses with a prosthetic hand by filming the subject’s true hand 393 
and replaying this to them, in real time (56). An ‘interoceptive rubber hand illusion’ is 394 
achieved by causing the virtual hand to flush in synchrony with the participant’s heartbeat. In 395 
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this paradigm it is now the people with high IAcc who experience the greater illusion. This 396 
illustrates the crucial effect of context, whereby the interoceptive priors now indicate that the 397 
virtual hand is one’s own. People with high IAcc (measured by heartbeat discrimination), 398 
whom our model assumes are able to raise the precision of interoceptive cues by attention, 399 
are now more likely to claim ownership of this virtual hand (56).  400 
 401 
(vii) Neuroeconomic decision-making and motivation 402 
People vary considerably in their decisions about whether to take risks and also about 403 
whether to exert effort (57,58). Potentially, decision-making and bodily signals are linked and 404 
this is reflected in information processing in the insula. It has been shown, for example, that 405 
the insula is activated both by predictions (priors) about the risk involved in any decision and 406 
also by risk PEs that update these priors (59). Signals in the insula are seen to gradually 407 
increase during both effortful exertion and during subsequent rests (60), suggesting that the 408 
insula is encoding changes in bodily state – perhaps reflecting the precision of PEs, which 409 
may continuously rise until a threshold is reached that updates the prior and triggers a change 410 
in behaviour. Thus variability in behaviour and insula activity during neuroeconomic 411 
decision-making tasks may potentially reflect individual differences in IAcc and thus the 412 
influence of interoception on behaviour.  413 
 414 
Evidence in support of this is that individuals with higher IAcc work less hard during self-415 
paced exercise (61) and, likewise, for identical objective changes in bodily signals, the 416 
choices they make when evaluating risks tend to reflect their bodily changes (17). Our model 417 
explains this in terms of changes in the state of the body, including heart rate and cardiac 418 
output, that result from risky behaviours and physical exertion (2). Assuming that these 419 
interoceptive changes have the effect of increasing the precision of PEs relative to priors, our 420 
model would predict that when the individual must make a decision the more accumulation 421 
there is of precise PEs the greater change there will be in the ‘value’ associated with any 422 
given choice. People with high IAcc who (in contrast to those with low IAcc) can raise the 423 
precision of their PEs with attention, will more readily accumulate sufficient precision in PEs 424 
to update their priors and thus affect their choice behaviour. Thus we would expect to see 425 
greater influence of interoceptive PEs on behaviour in people with higher IAcc and that also 426 
such individuals would be less willing to expend physical effort, as borne out by the 427 
empirical evidence (17,61).   428 
 429 
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Interoceptive accuracy in clinical disorders  430 
High IAcc is common in panic disorder and anxiety (62). Conversely inaccuracy in heartbeat 431 
counting has been linked to alexithymia, eating disorders, depression, functional disorders 432 
and depersonalisation/derealisation (see (63) for a review and also (64) in this issue). Our 433 
model suggests that an individual’s ability (IAcc) and tendency (trait interoceptive 434 
awareness) to use focused attention to adjust precision in interoceptive systems potentially 435 
plays a role in the aetiology of these disorders and may be relevant to their remediation.  436 
 437 
The interoceptive priors of healthy people update over time, as the brain seeks to optimise 438 
precision (8). However, what is Bayes optimal for a given individual may give rise to 439 
aberrant behaviour if generative models include highly precise priors at some level of the 440 
hierarchy that are unable to update appropriately to incoming sensory signals (26). A number 441 
of clinical disorders have been characterised in this fashion including schizophrenia (23), 442 
somatisation (54), depression (7) and autism (30).  443 
 444 
Attention and learning play a crucial role in assigning and optimising precision. Our model 445 
proposes that people with high IAcc can increase precision in interoceptive systems with 446 
attention because they have higher-level (unconscious) prior beliefs that prioritise 447 
interoception and hence allow them to increase precision in interoceptive systems generally 448 
and hence raise the precision of interoceptive PEs relative to priors (63). In some (but not 449 
necessarily all such people) this may reflect habits of attention to their internal bodily 450 
changes. This could explain why certain individuals are more vulnerable to some disorders 451 
but less prone to others. For example, alexithymia, a condition characterized by difficulties in 452 
identifying and describing emotion, may be accompanied by low IAcc (65). Our model 453 
implies that sufferers may have highly precise interoceptive priors that do not update 454 
appropriately to interoceptive PEs, making it difficult for them to gain awareness of the 455 
interoceptive changes that signal affect. 456 
 457 
Habits of excessive attention to harmless bodily cues have, however, been proposed as the 458 
basis of both panic disorder, which has been linked to higher IAcc (66), and functional 459 
disorders, which are associated with lower IAcc (67). It has accordingly been argued that 460 
disorders associated with IAcc may depend fundamentally on cognitive interpretation of the 461 
relevance of these sensations, rather than on the availability of the interoceptive sensations 462 
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per se (68). These interpretations take the form of stable, precise, high-level cognitive priors 463 
(beliefs) which do not update appropriately with learning but instead inappropriately bias 464 
attention, resulting in interoceptive generative models in which precise priors, at some level, 465 
fail to update. High-level beliefs about future threat to the self, for example, may underpin all 466 
anxiety disorders (68), which are more common amongst people with high IAcc (62). 467 
Sufferers (e.g. phobics) typically avoid the anxiety-provoking stimuli, which suggests that 468 
their precise but inaccurate beliefs are maintained by avoidance of disconfirming evidence. 469 
Our model adds to this explanation by proposing that because people with high IAcc are able 470 
to direct their attention to interoceptive cues their internal bodily changes are more likely to 471 
reach awareness, predisposing them to anxiety by enhancing the perception of threat. 472 
However, although people with high IAcc have the ability to be aware of interoceptive cues 473 
under focused attention, this does not necessarily imply that all such individuals habitually 474 
misinterpret the significance of such sensation or suffer from anxiety disorders. 475 
 476 
There is currently much research interest in therapeutic interventions based on enhanced body 477 
awareness that typically ask patients to practice attending to interoceptive sensations (63). 478 
Our model implies that consideration should crucially be paid to whether the patient’s IAcc is 479 
high or low. For example, the many people with panic disorder who have high IAcc (66) may 480 
benefit from paying less attention to the body and more to reducing the precision of high-481 
level beliefs about the danger of real but harmless interoceptive sensations, which other 482 
individuals with high IAcc recognise as normal for themselves (63). However, if an 483 
individual with panic disorder has low IAcc (66), their interoceptive sensations are likely to 484 
be illusory and for them it may consequently be therapeutic to find ways to improve their 485 
ability to adjust precision in low-level interoceptive systems. Likewise, functional disorders 486 
are assumed to involve an over-precise prior at some undetermined level of the hierarchy 487 
(54). We suggest that low IAcc in such patients potentially indicates that the fault lies with 488 
highly precise (but inaccurate) precision in low-level interoceptive sensation, whereas high 489 
IAcc would imply that a precise high-level belief may be the cause.  490 
 491 
Future directions  492 
Our characterisation of IAcc in terms of precision in interoceptive systems raises a number of 493 
potential research questions. If the precision of interoception PEs can be experimentally 494 
enhanced (e.g. by attention to interoception) we predict that this will result in diminished 495 
experience of body illusions. Conversely, if synchronous multisensory stimulation raises the 496 
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precision of all incoming self-relevant sensory data, changes in body-ownership while 497 
experiencing the rubber hand illusion should result in increases in IAcc. Potentially, 498 
autonomic reflexes (observable under ECG) are engaged by people with higher IAcc while 499 
they resist the rubber hand illusion, as they update interoceptive priors that anchor them to the 500 
true hand. Given the involvement of the anterior insula in IAcc and the mid-posterior insula 501 
in body-ownership, our model predicts that fMRI during the rubber hand illusion will reveal 502 
changes in functional connectivity within the insula during synchronous vs. asynchronous 503 
visuotactile stimulation and that this will be modulated by the precision of PEs i.e. by IAcc. 504 
We predict that other processes dependent on sensorimotor integration, such as feelings of 505 
agency will be modulated by IAcc. Actions produce exteroceptive effects in the world but 506 
they also have crucial interoceptive consequences that support homeostasis. The amplitude of 507 
the HEP may also be used to probe interoceptive precision, for example we expect that this 508 
will be modulated by attention to exteroceptive self-relevant cues. Finally we propose that 509 
therapeutic interventions in conditions such as anxiety, somatisation and alexithymia will be 510 
more effective when tailored to the patient’s IAcc. 511 
Conclusion 512 
Predictive coding accounts of interoceptive processing have recently been proposed to 513 
account for phenomenal consciousness (5) and mental illness (7). We go beyond these 514 
models to propose a novel predictive coding account of interoceptive awareness whereby 515 
individual differences can be explained in terms of variations in the ‘precision’ with which 516 
interoceptive signals from within the body are represented. Our model characterises 517 
individual differences in ‘interoceptive accuracy’ (as measured by heartbeat perception) by 518 
hypothesising that higher (vs. lower) IAcc arises when the individual is able to use attention 519 
to call interoceptive sensation into awareness when needed. This implies the presence of a 520 
prior at a higher level that can, when appropriate, prioritise interoceptive sensation over other 521 
sensory modalities. The established but sometimes contradictory literature linking 522 
interoceptive accuracy with such variables as autonomic reactivity, emotional experience and 523 
body ownership can be readily explained within our model, which may also have 524 
implications for clinical conditions associated with both high and low IAcc.  525 
 526 
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Caption: Figure 1 represents a schematic overview of the hierarchical message passing in the 693 
brain that is assumed to underlie predictive coding. Predictions (priors) are illustrated as 694 
black lines that project down the levels of the hierarchy, from prediction units (deep 695 
pyramidal cells) shown as black triangles. Forward projecting prediction errors are 696 
represented by red lines, passing up the hierarchy from prediction error units (superficial 697 
pyramidal cells), which are represented by red triangles. Importantly, PEs and predictions 698 
occur at every level. The dashed red and black arrows indicate local processing within a 699 
level. At Level 1 they thus represent an autonomic reflex. Precision, which plays the crucial 700 
role of determining the relative weigh of the PEs vs. the priors, at every level of the 701 
hierarchy, passes down the hierarchy and is indicated by the blue arrows. A percept is formed 702 
when PE is minimised at all levels within the hierarchy. Adapted from (54). 703 
  704 
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Caption Figure 2. The graphs show Gaussian probability distributions representing, at one 705 
particular level in the hierarchy, the descending prior and posterior and the ascending PEs 706 
(which arises from the incoming sensory data). These distributions refer to some hidden state 707 
of the organism (e.g. some aspect of its interoceptive state) that has to be inferred. The widths 708 
of the various distributions correspond to their variance. Precision is the inverse of variance. 709 
The relative precision of PEs and prior is crucial in determining the updating of the prior to 710 
the posterior. The top panel indicates a context in which the precision of the PEs is precise 711 
(relative to the prior) so that the posterior is shifted towards the PEs. In the bottom panel, by 712 
contrast, imprecise PEs have little impact on the prior. The posterior then descends to the 713 
level below this in the hierarchy where it becomes, in turn, the empirical prior. Adapted from 714 
(69). 715 
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